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An important contention in Norman Malcolm's monograph, Dreaming, 1 
was that skepticism about one's present state (Am I awake or dreaming?) 
is untenable. Malcolm's book has been thoroughly and effectively criticized 
from a number of vantage points, but implicit in it is one argument against 
skepticism which these criticisms leave unscathed. I wish to call attention 
to this facet of Malcolm's doctrine, and to argue against it. 
Malcolm devotes a great deal of space to analyzing the sentence 'I am 
awake', but his conclusions are not always consistent. At times (e.g., 
p. 118) he seems to think that the sentence can be used to make a true 
statement. At other points (120), however, he adopts the view that a 
person who says 'I am awake' is giving a performance (showing himself to 
be awake), rather than reporting or describing his own state. From this 
latter view an argument against the possibility o f  dream skepticism seems 
derivable. Since, in saying 'I am awake', a person is showing rather than 
claiming that something is the case, there is no room tbr the concept of 
error (120). 
Now, Malcolm is certainly correct in pointing out the performative 
force of 'I am awake'. This can be seen by noting the occasions on which 
a grunt could be substituted without loss for 'I am awake' in answer to a 
question. But the skeptic should remain unmoved by this insight. For, it 
might be admitted that i f  I am really saying 'I am awake', then I am 
giving a performance, and cannot possibly be dreaming that I am awake. 
Yet perhaps I am not really saying 'I am awake'; perhaps I am only 
dreaming that I am saying it. To call attention to the performative force of 
'I am awake' is not thereby to preclude the possibility of someone's 
dreaming that he gives the performance. Thus, the performative analysis 
of 'I am awake' is compatible with dream skepticism. 
There is another anti-skeptical line which an advocate of the performa- 
five analysis could try at this point. If the sentence 'I am awake' had no 
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descriptive content (Malcolm, p. 120), and could only be used performa- 
tively, then, like a cry of pain, it could not occur as the propositional 
object of the verb 'dream'. To take an example from an expression clearly 
lacking in descriptive content: I can dream that I said 'Ouch!', but I can- 
not dream that ouch. So the skeptical possibility - 'Perhaps at this mo- 
ment I am dreaming that I am awake' - presumably could no longer be 
formulated. This result would reinforce Malcolm's suggestion (118) that 
the sentence 'I don't  know whether I 'm awake or dreaming' is nonsensical. 
The conclusion here is much more surprising than in the case of at 
least many other performatives. The reason is that our intuitions usually 
keep us from thinking that sentences allocated exclusively for performative 
use could occur as objects of intentional verbs. There is nothing intuitively 
wrong with 'I am dreaming that I am awake', whereas (a) 'I am dreaming 
that I promise' sounds odd; we would, I think, tend to dismiss it in favor 
of (b) 'I am dreaming that I am promising'. (If we allowed (a) at all, we 
would have to construe 'I promise' non-performatively, describing a repet- 
itive activity as in 'I pray' or 'I  eat meat'.) And once modification (b) is 
accomplished ,we are no longer left with a sentence whose use is exclusively 
performative, although in some circumstances 'I am promising' can 
substitute performatively for 'I  promise'. In this way, our intiutions 
generally keep us from talking nonsense. 
Suppose now, for the sake of argument, that thesentence 'I am awake' 
had no descriptive content whatever, being reserved exclusively for per- 
formative use. It would indeed follow that in one sense the skeptical 
possibility concerning dreams was unformulable, inasmuch as the sentence 
'Perhaps at this moment I am dreaming that I am awake' would be 
unintelligible. But even if i n  this sense the skeptical possibility were 
unformulable, the skeptic could still employ his original argument. For 
example, i f I  presently suppose that the sentence 'I am dreaming that I am 
awake' is senseless, I can still wonder whether my supposition is occurring 
in a dream, or in waking life. Opting for one alternative over the other 
introduces the possibility of error, which is precisely the foundation upon 
which the skeptic is forever building his case. I f  the skeptic is successful 
here, his argument can be generalized. The main point is just this: As long 
as a person can wonder whether any of his concerns are arising in a dream, 
or in waking life, there is always the possibility of  his getting the answer 
wrong. Again, what more could skepticism require? 
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There is still one item to be reckoned with. I f  it is assumed (falsely, I 
believe) that 'I  am awake' is limited to performative use, then I am logically 
debarred from doubting that I am awake. Nevertheless, this turns out only 
to be a remark about the scope of the skeptic's vocabulary. For  it is still 
possible for me to doubt that my presently occurring experience is part of 
my waking life. Thus, to say that the skeptical possibility is nonsense is 
only to say that one way of stating the skeptical problem has been 
eliminated. What is important is that other ways remain. 
The argument against skepticism for which Malcolm is generally 
credited is based upon his well-known theory 'that if anyone holds that 
dreams are identical with, or composed of, thoughts, impressions, feelings, 
images, and so on (here one may supply whatever mental nouns one likes, 
except "dreams"), occurring in sleep, then his view is false' (52). Notice, 
however, that the 'argument from performatives' is logically independent 
of this highly controversial thesis. Any defense of dream skepticism, 
therefore, cannot rest content with an attack on Malcolm's denial of 
occurrent mental activity during sleep. I have attempted to supply the 
missing link and, if I am correct, it looks as if the skeptic's ground has not 
been cut away by Malcolm's appeal to the performative use of 'I am 
awake'. 9. 
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